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Legal Aspects of Satellite Constellations
Damian M. BIELICKI*
In recent years a few entrepreneurs proposed launching into space large fleets of satellites,
consisting of hundreds of satellites, often referred to as ‘constellations’. Their role is to provide
satellite services to the largest possible number of users on Earth. This article provides a review of
key legal issues associated with satellite constellations, including responsibility and liability for
potential damages caused by satellites being a part of a constellation, insurance, registration of
space objects, allocation of radio frequencies and orbital slots, and space debris.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Billions of people around the world rely on satellite infrastructures every day. The
satellite applications are used for telecommunication, transportation, agriculture,
fisheries, weather forecast, research on space environment, entertainment, military
objectives, and many more. Continued economic growth has increased the reli-
ance on satellites and, therefore, the satellite infrastructures are transforming, in
order to keep up with the constantly expanding demand. This may lead to the
increasing creation of larger fleets, consisting of hundreds or thousands of satellites,
often referred to as constellations. The role of these constellations is to provide
services to as many users on Earth as possible. Constellations certainly open up
many new opportunities but they also give rise to potential risks and legal
problems. The latter may include issues around international liability and respon-
sibility for potential damage in space or on Earth, insurance, licensing and registra-
tion, allocation of radio frequencies and orbital slots, and even space debris. These
are the problems that are the focus of this article.
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2 TERMINOLOGY
The term ‘satellite constellation’ is not defined in international law. Both aca-
demics and practitioners use this term without specifying its meaning as well.
According to its ordinary meaning, it refers to a group of artificial satellites
cooperating together under common control. The goal of constellations is to
cover the largest possible area of the globe. This could have military relevance,
e.g. for espionage, in case of military satellites, but it is equally important for civil
purposes, e.g. to reach largest number of users for satellite services. Satellites in a
constellation are often arrayed and use inter-satellite communication. This is
particularly important for satellites that are placed in Low-Earth Orbit (at an
altitude of 2,000 km/1,200 mi or less) in order to provide stable and continuous
services.1
Neither the size of the individual satellites, nor the location of the constella-
tion in space or its purpose seem to have much significance for the definition.
However, the question arises whether there should be a certain minimum number
of satellites in order to call a group of satellites a ‘constellation’. By 2020 one of the
smallest groups of satellites was the Earth observation mission called RapidEye,
which consisted of five satellites.2 The largest group was the sixty-six satellites of
the Iridium constellation.3 More recent constellation projects include hundreds
and even thousands of satellites. Although the minimum number of satellites does
not seem to have any significance at the moment, the different constellations vary
dramatically in size. In future this may have an impact on various practical aspects,
such as insurance, the allocation of orbital slots and radio frequencies, where large
fleets may be treated as a single unit.4 Thus, practitioners may in future specify a
certain minimum number of satellites required to classify the group as a ‘constella-
tion’. Interestingly, one such definition has already been implemented. In
November 2019 the US Government issued new Orbital Debris Mitigation
Standard Practices in which it defines a large constellation as ‘a constellation consist-
ing of 100 or more operational spacecraft cumulative’.5
1 Inter-Agency Space Debris Co-ordination Committee (IADC), IADC Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines, IADC-02-01 (6 Sept. 2007), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/
IADC-2002-01-IADC-Space_Debris-Guidelines-Revision1.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
2 N. Crisp, K. Smith & P. Hollingsworth, Launch and Deployment of Distributed Small Satellite Systems,
114 Acta Astronautica 66 (2015).
3 More information can be found on the official Iridium website, https://www.iridium.com/company-
info/companyprofile/ (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
4 For the potential impact see s. 4 of this article.
5 See US Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, Nov. 2019 Update, s. 5-1, at 7,
https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/usg_orbital_debris_mitigation_standard_practices_novem
ber_2019.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
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3 EXAMPLES OF MULTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS
The first constellations already appeared in the 1960s. One of the first was the Soviet
‘Molniya’ (Russian: Lightning) military constellation. The first operational satellite,
Molniya 1-01, was successfully placed in orbit in April 1965. The complete
Molniya-1 constellation consisting of ten satellites began operating in 1968. The
satellites had a lifespan of approximately 1.5 years and so they had to be constantly
replaced.6 Currently, the constellation is used for broadcasting the national television
network called Orbit, and the lifespan of the satellites increased to over five years.7
Also in the 1960s, the United States created the first global satellite navigation system
called ‘Transit’. The first satellite of the Transit system was launched in 1960, and
until 1968 there was a fully functional constellation of thirty-six satellites. Transit
operated for twenty-eight years, until 1996, when it was replaced by the US
Department of Defense with the Global Positioning System (GPS).8 In 2020, the
GPS consisted of a constellation of thirty-one satellites. Although satellite navigation,
like most space technologies, was initially designed to achieve military goals, over
time it has become one of the most practical space applications used for civil
purposes. Therefore, other states started developing their own constellations used
for satellite navigation. Currently operational systems include the Chinese ‘Compass’
system,9 the European ‘Galileo’ system,10 and the Russian ‘GLONASS’ system.11
The above examples represent government programmes. Over time, non-
governmental entities started developing constellations for commercial pur-
poses. One example is Orbcomm, a US based company offering telecommu-
nications and internet services. In 2020 the company had a constellation of
6 The lifespan of modern satellites varies; currently it can range from six months to fifteen years. It
depends on several factors, including the size of satellite, the orbit, and many more. See S. B. Johnson,
Space Exploration and Humanity: A Historical Encyclopaedia vol. 1, 416 (Greenwood Publishing Group:
Santa Barbara 2010); Francis Lyall & Paul Larsen, Space Law – A Treatise 89 (2d ed., Routledge 2018).
7 See ‘Molniya-1’, archival article of the Astronautix portal, https://web.archive.org/web/
20080516082459/http://www.astronautix.com/craft/molniya1.htm (accessed 4 Feb. 2020). See also
Russian Space Web, Russian Communications Satellites (27 Feb. 2019), http://www.russianspaceweb.
com/spacecraft_comsats.html (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
8 Defence Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), Transit Satellite: Space-Based Navigation,
https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/timeline/transit-satellite, (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
9 It is known in China as Beidou. It consists of twenty-three satellites. See more: L. Wang, Directions
2017: BeiDou’s Road to Global Service, GPS World (6 Dec. 2016), http://gpsworld.com/directions-
2017-beidous-road-to-global-service/ (accessed 4 Feb. 2020); G. Yuan, Sky’s the Limit for Beidou’s
Clients, China Daily (16 Nov. 2015), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/tech/2015-11/16/
content_22464083.htm, (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
10 In 2018, Galileo consisted of twenty-six satellites. See European Commission, Space: 26 Galileo
Satellites Now in Orbit for Improved EU Satellite Navigation Signal, EC Press Release (25 July 2018),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4603_en.htm (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
11 In 2019, GLONASS consisted of twenty-six satellites. See the report of the Information and Analysis
Centre for Positioning, Navigation and Timing from 21 May 2019, https://www.glonass-iac.ru/en/
GLONASS/ (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
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twenty-four first-generation OG1 satellites, and a fleet of sixteen second-gen-
eration OG2 satellites.12 Another example is the Iridium constellation, consist-
ing of sixty-six satellites used for global voice communication and data transfer.
The Iridium network is unique because it covers the entire Earth, including
polar regions, oceans and airways.13 Such large constellations are not unique to
the United States, as there are examples of companies based on other continents
that developed large satellite fleets. One example of a European constellations is
‘O3b’, operated by SES S.A. based in Luxembourg. The company has a fleet of
sixteen satellites designed to transmit voice and data to mobile operators and
internet service providers.14 In Asia, the Japanese SKY Perfect JSAT Group
operates a constellation of seventeen satellites for the purpose of communica-
tions and television broadcasting.15
By 2020, the largest group of satellites was the Iridium constellation.
However, the second decade of the twenty-first century brings about much larger
projects, often referred to as mega-constellations. These projects consist of hun-
dreds and even thousands of satellites synchronized under common control. For
instance, in 2016 China announced its Hongyan (Chinese: ‘Wild Goose’) com-
munications constellation, consisting of over 300 small satellites to be placed in
Low-Earth Orbit.16 Another project was announced by OneWeb, a company
based in the United Kingdom planning to launch over 800 satellites to provide
internet services worldwide, especially in places where there is no internet at all.17
OneWeb launched 74 satellites but it failed to secure new funding from investors
and on 27 March 2020 it filed for bankruptcy protection with a pursue to sell its
business.18 However, the largest announced project is by the United States’
company SpaceX. In 2016, the company’s lawyers filed an application with the
Federal Communications Commission19 for permission to launch about 12,000
satellites as a part of ‘Starlink’ constellation.20 In 2018, the Commission approved
12 See official Orbcomm website, https://www.orbcomm.com/en/networks/satellite/orbcomm-og2
(accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
13 See official Iridium website, https://www.iridium.com/network/globalnetwork/ (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
14 See official SES website, https://www.ses.com/our-coverage/satellites (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
15 See official JSAT website, https://www.jsat.net/en/ (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
16 A. Jones, Early Launch Plans for China’s Hongyan LEO Communications Satellite Constellation Revealed,
GBTimes (12 Mar. 2018), https://gbtimes.com/early-launch-plans-for-chinas-hongyan-leo-commu
nications-satellite-constellation-revealed (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
17 See official OneWeb website, http://www.oneweb.world/ (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
18 See OneWeb Press Release on 27 March 2020 available at: https://www.oneweb.world/media-
center/oneweb-files-for-chapter-11-restructuring-to-execute-sale-process (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
19 The Federal Communications Commission is an independent agency of the United States government
created by statute to regulate interstate communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable;
see official website, https://www.fcc.gov/ (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
20 S. Kettley, SpaceX Launch: Elon Musk’s 12,000 Satellite Starlink Network Will Beam Worldwide Internet,
Express Online (22 Feb. 2018), https://www.express.co.uk/news/science/919947/space-launch-starlink-
satellites-internet-network-elon-musk (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
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the constellation of 4,425 satellites that are intended to provide fast and reliable
internet around the world.21 The first two test satellites called MicroSat-2a and
MircoSat-2b22 were successfully placed in orbit in February 2018.23 A second set
of sixty test satellites were successfully launched on 24 May 2019.24 Another sixty
were placed into orbit on 11 November 2019,25 and again on 7 January 2020,
bringing it to a total number of 182 satellites.26 Initial commercial operation of the
constellation is predicted for late 2020/early 2021.
4 THE LEGAL PROBLEMS
There are certain obvious benefits of having a large satellite constellation, including
financial gain, competitiveness, quality of services offered, and the number of customers.
In case of satellites related to defence and security, the strategic aspect should also be taken
into account. It is therefore likely, for both military and commercial reasons, that the
number of satellites in orbit around the Earth will increase. This may lead to certain
problems of a legal nature. The most obvious is international responsibility and liability
for potential damages caused by satellites. Other key issues oscillate around the insurance,
the registration of space objects, the allocation of radio frequencies and orbital slots, as
well as space debris. This article considers these issues on the following pages.
4.1 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY
The legal basis for international responsibility and liability in space can be found in
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
21 Federal Communications Commission, Memorandum Opinion, Order and Authorization in the Matter of
Application For Approval for Orbital Deployment and Operating Authority for the SpaceX NGSO Satellite
System (28 Mar. 2018), FCC 18–38, Call Sign S2983, https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/
Daily_Business/2018/db0329/FCC-18-38A1.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
22 They are also known as Tintin A and Tintin B.
23 L. Grush, SpaceX Just Launched Two of Its Space Internet Satellites – The First of Nearly 12,000, The Verge
(22 Feb. 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/15/17016208/spacex-falcon-9-launch-starlink-
microsat-2a-2b-paz-watch-live (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
24 S. Hall, After SpaceX Starlink Launch, a Fear of Satellites That Outnumber All Visible Stars, The New York
Times (01 June 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/science/starlink-spacex-astronomers.
html (accessed 4 Feb. 2020); M. Wall, SpaceX’s 60-Satellite Launch Is Just the Beginning for Starlink
Megaconstellation Project, Space.com (24 May 2019), https://www.space.com/spacex-starlink-satellites-
launch-just-beginning.html (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
25 A. Thompson, SpaceX Just Launched 60 Starlink Satellites (And Nailed a Milestone Rocket Landing), Space.
com (12 Nov. 2019), https://www.space.com/spacex-starlink-launch-fourth-rocket-landing-success.
html, (accessed 4 Feb. 2020); S. Clark, Successful Launch Continues Deployment of SpaceX’s Starlink
Network, Spaceflight Now (11 Nov. 2019), https://spaceflightnow.com/2019/11/11/successful-
launch-continues-deployment-of-spacexs-starlink-network/ (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
26 See Official Starlink website, https://www.spacex.com/news/2020/01/07/starlink-mission (accessed 4
Feb. 2020).
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Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1967, also
known as the ‘Outer Space Treaty’ (OST).27 According to Article VI of the OST:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer
space ( … ) whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities ( … ). The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space ( … )
shall require authorisation and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the
Treaty.28
The matter of liability is regulated in detail in the Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects, also known as the Liability Convention (LC)29:
a launching state shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its
space object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight.30
However, in the event of damage being caused anywhere else, the launching state
will be liable only ‘if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom
it is responsible’.31 The term ‘launching state’ means ‘(i) A state which launches or
procures the launching of a space object; (ii) A state from whose territory or facility
a space object is launched’.32
A key distinction has to be made between the OST and the LC provisions. Under
Article VI OST, each state is responsible for ‘national activities in outer space’. However,
under Article VIIOST andArticle II LC it is the ‘launching state’ that is liable for damages
caused by the space object.33 International responsibility for space activities rests solely on
states; and it has to be interpreted in the light of general international law, as a breach of an
international obligation arising out of an act or omission and attributable to a state.34 The
main criterion for liability, unlike in case of responsibility, is damage (and its attribut-
ability), and its only consequence is the duty to pay for the damage. No fault, either
subjective (culpa, intent, negligence), or objective (breach of law) is necessary for liability
27 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 2222 (XXI), opened for signature on 27 Jan. 1967,
entered into force on 10Oct. 1967, 634UNTS 205. By 1 Jan. 2019 it was ratified by 109 States and signed by
another 23 States. More on the development of the Space Treaties see D. M. Bielicki, Air Law & Space
Law – Historical Aspects and Perspectives for Future, 63 J. Brit. Interplanetary Soc’y 262ff (2010).
28 Article VI OST.
29 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 2777 (XXVI), opened for signature on 29
Mar. 1972, entered into force on 1 Sept. 1972, 961 UNTS 187. By 1 Jan. 2019 it was ratified by
ninety-six States and signed by another nineteen States. Moreover, ESA, EUMETSAT, EUTELSAT
and INTERSPUTNIK signed a declaration of acceptance of rights and obligations of the Convention.
30 Article II LC.
31 Article III LC.
32 Article I(c) LC.
33 Handbook of Space Law, Research Handbooks in International Law, 52 (F. G. von der Dunk & F.
Tronchetti eds, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham 2015).
34 See Arts 1–3 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. See also F. G. von der Dunk, Liability Versus
Responsibility in Space Law: Misconception or Misconstruction?, Proc. Thirty-fourth Colloquium L. Outer
Space 366–367 (1992); P. S. Dempsey, Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects Under International
and National Law, XXXVII Annals of Air & Space L. 333 (2012).
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to occur.35 Responsibility is borne for ‘activities’, whereas liability is given for ‘damages’
caused by space objects.36 In the context of large constellations of satellites, different states
might thus be held responsible from that to be held liable.
Pursuant to Article II LC, a launching state is to be ‘absolutely liable’,
without proof of fault, to pay compensation for damage inflicted on the
surface of the Earth, or to aircraft in flight. This is a distinct concept of
liability that recognizes situations approved by states (e.g. through licensing
process), which may nevertheless present acute and catastrophic danger.
Absolute liability is therefore automatic and unlimited, in order to enable
full compensation to be made available in ultra-hazardous situations.37 It
seems that only in some exceptional situations the absolute character of the
provision can be disregarded, in particular when the victim had a certain
impact on their own damage by, for instance, ignoring warnings about an
imminent danger.38 This is contrasted with Article III LC which refers to
‘fault liability’ in case of damages in outer space. In this case, the launching
state is only liable if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for
whom it is responsible. The damage caused may apply to a person or an
object in space, and may be caused by a functional space object, as well as a
non-functional debris.39 However, in all cases, the causal link between the
damage and the space object, and the identification of the launching state(s) of
the latter, must be established. Proof of causation may be difficult in some
cases of damage in space, especially when the damage was caused by space
debris. This also means that incidents caused by debris may not always be
dealt with in a satisfactory manner.40
By 2020, Article II of the LC, concerning absolute liability, had practical
application to two events only. The first took place in January 1978, when
Kosmos 954, a Soviet nuclear reconnaissance satellite caused the spread of
radioactive debris over a significant, uninhabited area of North-West Canada.
Canada demanded compensation from the Soviet Union of more than 6
million Canadian dollars for undertaking operations directed at locating,
recovering, removing and testing the debris and cleaning up the affected
35 von der Dunk, supra n. 34.
36 S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd, K-U. Schrogl & G. M. Goh, Cologne Commentary on Space Law vol. 1, 104
(Carl Heymamms Verlag: Cologne 2009).
37 Ibid, vol. 2, at 121–125.
38 F. G. von der Dunk, Passing the Buck to Rogers: International Liability Issues in Private Spaceflight, 86 Neb.
L. Rev. 412 (2007).
39 Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd, Schrogl & Goh, supra n. 35, vol. 2, at 132–133.
40 Lyall & Larsen, supra n. 6, at 100.
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areas. The case was resolved by diplomatic means, and the Soviet
Union agreed to pay the amount of approximately 3 million.41 The second
event took place a year later. On 11 July 1979, the remains of the American
Skylab space station were scattered over Western Australia and the southern
part of the Indian Ocean without causing any damage to a person or a
property and, consequently, no claims have been made.42 In case of modern
constellations, most satellites are designed to completely burn up as they
descend through the atmosphere at the end of their life cycle. However,
there is always a risk that a satellite could break up over a populated area.
Therefore, it should not be assumed that potential absolute liability is not
applicable at all. Article III of the 1972 LC, concerning damage caused
‘anywhere else’, other than on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight,
have not had any practical application yet. However, it is worth mentioning
that collisions in space took place but the State Parties to the LC decided not
to use the provisions of the Convention. For instance, the biggest collision of
two objects in space took place on 10 February 2009. Deactivated Russian
military telecommunications satellite Kosmos 2251 and operating American
telecommunications satellite Iridium 33 collided 789 km above North Siberia.
Both satellites, flying about 11.7 km/s, were destroyed.43 More recently, on 2
September 2019, European Space Agency (ESA) performed a collision avoid-
ance manoeuvre to protect its Aeolus Earth observation satellite from collid-
ing with a SpaceX satellite in the Starlink constellation.44 Following this
event, ESA announced that it is developing a collision avoidance system
that will ‘automatically assess the risk and likelihood of in-space collisions,
improve the decision making process on whether or not a manoeuvre is
needed, and may even send the orders to at-risk satellites to get out of the
way’.45 In case of a damage caused, it is important to identify the state
internationally liable for activities carried on by non-governmental entities.
International law provides that space activities require ‘authorisation and
41 The claim was based on Art. II of the LC and on General Principles of International Law. See more:
Settlement of Claim Between Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage Caused by
‘Cosmos 954’ (Released on 2 Apr. 1981), http://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_3/3-2-2-1_
e.html (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
42 Lyall & Larsen, supra n. 6, at 106–107. For more space-related cases see Damian M. Bielicki, Evidence
from Space in Cases Before International Courts and Tribunals, in Outer Space Law: Legal Policy and Practice
335 ff (Yanal Abul Failat & Anél Ferreira-Snyman eds, Globe Law and Business 2017).
43 B. Iannotta, U.S. Satellite Destroyed in Space Collision, Space.com (11 Feb. 2009), https://www.space.
com/5542-satellite-destroyed-space-collision.html (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
44 European Space Agency, ESA Spacecraft Dodges Large Constellation, ESA Safety & Security (3 Sept.
2019), ttps://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/ESA_spacecraft_dodges_large_constellation (accessed 4
Feb. 2020).
45 European Space Agency, Automatic Collision Avoidance, ESA Safety & Security (22 Oct. 2019), https://
www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Automating_collision_avoidance (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
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continuing supervision’ by the appropriate state.46 Therefore, states require
private entities to obtain a license from relevant authorities, prior to their
engagement in space activities. They are also required to obtain appropriate
insurance cover. These aspects are discussed in the following sections.
4.2 REGISTRATION, RADIO FREQUENCIES AND ORBITAL SLOTS
The OST requires that space activities carried on by non-governmental entities be
‘authorized and continually supervised’ by the appropriate State Party to the
Treaty.47 The primary purpose of registration is to assist in the identification of
an object, e.g. in case of a collision. It is also helpful for traffic management.
Therefore, each object released into space should be registered in at least two of
the three available registers. First, each state can have a national registry and, if that
is the case, each launching state shall inform the Secretary-General of the UN of
the establishment of such a registry.48 Where there are two or more launching
states, they shall jointly determine which one of them shall register the space
object.49 However, states do not always agree on which one should register the
object.50 Moreover, there are many states that do not maintain their own national
register.51 The state on whose registry an object launched into space is carried shall
‘retain jurisdiction and control’ over such object.52 Second, space objects can also
be registered in one of the two registers maintained by the United Nations. The
first one is maintained by the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (OOSA). It has its
legal basis in the UN General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) of 1961 and it
contains a list of the objects launched into space.53 The second is a register of space
objects launched into Earth orbit or beyond and it is maintained by the UN
Secretary-General in accordance with the Registration Convention of 1975.54
46 Article VI OST.
47 Ibid.
48 Article II of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, adopted by the
UN General Assembly in its resolution 3235 (XXIX), opened for signature on 14 Jan. 1975, entered
into force on 15 Sept. 1975, 1023 UNTS 15. By 1 Jan. 2019 it was ratified by sixty-nine States and
signed by three other States.
49 Article II(1) and (2) ibid.
50 Lyall & Larsen, supra n. 6, at 79.
51 According to UN OOSA, in 2019 there were only forty States and organizations maintaining their
own register. See http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/national-registries/index.html
(accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
52 Article VIII OST.
53 UNGA Res. 1721 (XVI) 1961: International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, http://
www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/resolutions/res_16_1721.html (accessed 4 Feb.
2020).
54 See Arts III and IV of the Registration Convention.
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The register enables identification of the ‘owner’ of a given satellite, which is
important in the case of potential liability.
Satellite constellations may lead to more challenges to the registration system,
in particular to the way in which satellites are registered. Should each satellite be
registered separately? Should a constellation be registered as a single complex space
object, or perhaps as a group of interrelated space objects? The current practice is
inconsistent. There are examples of satellites belonging to a constellation but
registered separately, like in the case of the Navstar satellites that jointly create
the GPS system, and the Kosmos satellites that are a part of the Russian GLONASS
system. There are also examples of registrations of multiple satellites in one
application in the same administrative process, like in the case of Cluster II mission
of the ESA, consisting of four satellites (named Rumba, Tango, Salsa and Samba)
flying in a close configuration (‘cluster’) and registered jointly.55 The UN General
Assembly in its resolution 62/101 of 10 January 2008 recommended that:
in cases of joint launches of space objects, each space object should be registered separately
and, without prejudice to the rights and obligations of States, space objects should be
included, in accordance with international law, including the relevant United Nations
treaties on outer space, in the appropriate registry of the State responsible for the operation
of the space object under article VI of the OST.56
Additionally, relevant state institutions are responsible for frequency assignment,
and for allocating a position in the Earth’s orbit.57 These activities are coordinated
by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and more specifically by
the ITU Radiocommunication Sector, commonly known as the ITU-R. In
particular, the ITU allocates orbital positions and coordinates efforts to eliminate
harmful interference between stations of different states and private users.58
Moreover, the ITU-R improves the use made of the radio-frequency spectrum
by ensuring their rational, equitable, efficient and economical use.59
The ITU registers all frequency assignments in a database called the Master
International Frequency Register (MIFR).60 The MIFR is the final step in the
55 See Letter dated 27 Sept. 2000 from the Legal Adviser of the European Space Agency to the Secretary-
General, UN Secretariat Document ST/SG/SER.E/375 of 12 Oct. 2000, https://www.unoosa.org/
documents/pdf/ser375E.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
56 Paragraph 3(c) of resolution 62/101 of the UNGA: ‘Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States
and international intergovernmental organizations in registering space objects’, adopted during 62nd Session of
the UNGA, 10 Jan. 2008, A/RES/62/101.
57 Lyall & Larsen, supra n. 6, at 241.
58 Articles 1(2) (a) and (b) of the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union adopted
by the 2018 Plenipotentiary Conference, https ://www.i tu. int/en/history/Pages/
ConstitutionAndConvention.aspx (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
59 Article 12 ibid.
60 See ITU MIFR, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/terrestrial/broadcast/Pages/MIFR.aspx (accessed 4
Feb.. 2020). See also ITU FAQ, https://www.itu.int/net/ITU-R/index.asp?category=information&
rlink=faq&lang=en&faq=notification (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
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frequency coordination process and provides legal protection against harmful inter-
ference for assigned frequencies.61 As noted by the ITU, radio frequencies and
associated orbits are ‘limited natural resources and [they] must be used rationally,
efficiently and economically’.62 Thus their allocation may be problematic in future
due to an increasing number of satellites, including large constellations.63
In 2019, at the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-19) in Sharm
El-Sheikh, Egypt, Member States of the ITU established regulatory procedures for the
deployment of non-geostationary satellite systems (i.e. below the distance of 35,786
km/22,236 mi) in specific radio-frequency bands and services.64 Under this agree-
ment, 10% of satellite constellation must be deployed within two years after the end of
the current regulatory period for bringing into use, 50% within five years and
complete the deployment within seven years.65 If constellation ventures fail to launch
enough satellites by the milestones, or within the total fourteen years allotted, their
spectrum rights will be limited proportionally to the number launched before time ran
out. According to the ITU, this mechanism will allow the MIFR to reasonably reflect
the actual deployment of satellite constellations, and it will improve the functioning of
coordination mechanisms. It will help determine which spectrum applicants are truly
building and launching satellites, and which are not.66
4.3 SPACE INSURANCE
Space insurance is designed to protect against the financial consequences of losses
occurring before, during, and after the launch of satellites. There are two main types of
insurance: (1) first-party property insurance, and (2) third-party liability insurance.67
61 Ibid.
62 Article 44(2) of the ITU Constitution. See also the Preamble to the Radio Regulations 2016, http://
search.itu.int/history/HistoryDigitalCollectionDocLibrary/1.43.48.en.101.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
63 M. J. Peterson, International Regimes for the Final Frontier 194 (State University of New York Press
2005); M. J. Kleiman, J. K. Lamie & M-V. Carminati, The Laws of Spaceflight – A Guidebook for New
Space Lawyers 118–119 (American Bar Association, Chicago, IL 2012).
64 See ITU Radiocommunication Sector, Provisional Final Acts of the World Radiocommunication Conference
2019, Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt (28 Oct.-22 Nov. 2019), 425–426 (Geneva: ITU 2019), https://www.
itu.int/en/ITU-R/conferences/wrc/2019/Documents/PFA-WRC19-E.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
65 Sections 10–11 of the ITU Resolution COM5/7 (WRC-19), A Milestone-Based Approach for the
Implementation of Frequency Assignments to Space Stations in a Non-geostationary-Orbit Satellite System in
Specific Frequency Bands and Services, The World Radiocommunication Conference (Sharm el-Sheikh
2019), CMR19/2000-E.
66 ITU Press Release, ITU World Radiocommunication Conference Adopts New Regulatory Procedures for Non-
geostationary Satellites: Multiple Satellite Mega-Constellations in Low-Earth Orbit to Provide Extensive Global
Telecommunications Coverage (ITU: Sharm El-Sheikh 20 Nov. 2019), https://www.itu.int/en/media
centre/Pages/2019-PR23.aspx (accessed 4 Feb. 2020). See also C. Henry, ITU Sets Milestones for
Megaconstellations, Space News (21 Nov. 2019), https://spacenews.com/itu-sets-milestones-for-mega
constellations/ (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
67 Miguel Calvete, Insuring Outer Space Activities, in Outer Space Law: Legal Policy and Practice 143 (Yanal
Abul Failat & Anél Ferreira-Snyman eds, Globe Law and Business 2017).
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First-party property insurance, also known as material damage insurance,
covers physical damage to, or loss of, a space object during its manufacture, pre-
launch, launch and whilst it is in orbit. It may involve different parties, including a
satellite manufacturer, satellite operator, or a provider of launch services.68 Third-
party liability insurance covers the legal liabilities to third parties for bodily injury
or property damage. It is applicable to the situations when the space object is on
the ground, during launch or in orbit.69 There are other variants of these two types
of space insurance as well; these may include the service interruption, loss of profit,
loss of revenue, and other aspects related to space activities.70
If a space activity is carried on by a non-governmental entity, most national
laws require from such entities to take out insurance for potential damages caused
by their space activities. The main focus of this article is on the relevant legal
provisions in the United States71 and the United Kingdom.72
In the United States, the matter is regulated in the US Code: Title
51 – ‘National and Commercial Space Programs’.73 The entity whose space activities
were approved by the Secretary of Transportation (licensee)74 shall obtain liability
insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility ‘in amounts to compensate for the
maximum probable loss’.75 In the event of third-party claims for death, bodily
injury, or property damage or loss resulting from a space-related activity, a licensee
shall obtain insurance or demonstrate financial responsibly of no more than USD
500,000,000.76 However, the statutory law allows for the government to support
space companies and insure through the Federal Aviation Administration up to
USD 3.2 billion (as of 2020) – to be adjusted for inflation at time of claim.
Additionally, a licensee shall obtain insurance of no more than USD
100,000,000, against ‘a person for damage or loss to Government property result-
ing from an activity carried out under the license’.77 These amounts are for the
total claims related to one launch or re-entry. However, the required amounts can
be changed by the Secretary of Transport, after proper consultations with NASA,
68 Lloyd’s, Space Insurance, available at Lloyd’s official website: https://www.lloyds.com/tools-and-sys
tems/risk-locator/class-of-business-guidance/space (accessed 4 Feb. 2020); Marsh, Space and Satellite
Insurance, available at Marsh’s official website: https://www.marsh.com/uk/industries/aviation-aero
space/space-and-satellite-insurance.html (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 US Code: Title 51 – National and Commercial Space Programs, Subtitle V Pub. L. 111–314— (18 Dec.
2010).
72 Section 4, Outer Space Act 1998 c. 38.
73 51 U.S.C. §70112 (currently §50914), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/51/50914 (accessed
4 Feb. 2020).
74 For license application and requirements see 51 US Code §50905.
75 US Code, Title 51, Subtitle V, Ch. 509, §50914(a)(1).
76 US Code, Title 51, Subtitle V, Ch. 509, §50914(a)(3)(A)(i).
77 US Code, Title 51, Subtitle V, Ch. 509, §50914(a)(1)(B) and §50914(a)(3)(A)(ii).
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the United States Air Force and other relevant agencies.78 Since the abovemen-
tioned amounts are per satellite, potential lower insurance requirements are cer-
tainly an important factor for insuring a satellite constellation.
In the United Kingdom the matter is regulated by the Outer Space Act 1986
(OSA),79 the Space Industry Act 2018 (SIA) and other statutory instruments.80 The
OSA applies to activities carried out by UK nationals and companies outside the UK,
while the SIA is the main regulatory framework for all space-related activities carried
out in the UK.81 Both regimes require the licensees to indemnify the UK government
against any claims brought in respect of damage or loss arising out of space-related
activities.82 Insurance cover is one of the conditions to obtain a licence. A risk
assessment is carried out for each new licence application for a given mission and an
appropriate liability limit is determined, which must be specified in the licence.83 This
limit, in most cases, is capped at EUR 60,000,000, along with a third-party liability
insurance requirement.84 However, the UK Space Agency (UKSA) indicates that for
low-risk small satellites, it may lower or waive the third-party liability insurance
requirement.85 Therefore, the regulations allow for flexibility in this matter, so
insurance can be set at a different level, which can be attractive for the operators of
multiple-satellites or small satellite operators.86 In other words, the UK government
can assist the licensee by lowering financial responsibility, and the UK Government
would take part of the risk by meeting the remaining liability. Moreover, from 1
October 2018, the UKSA introduced a new approach to the in-orbit third-party
liability insurance requirement by changing the ‘per-satellite’ requirement to a ‘per-
occurrence’ requirement, also known as ‘any one occurrence’.87 For example, when
there are multiple satellites of the same standard-mission, the UKSA may allow all of
78 §50914(a)(2) ibid. See also M. Schaefer, The Need for Federal Preemption and International Negotiations
Regarding Liability Caps and Waivers of Liability in the US Commercial Space Industry, 33 Berkeley J. Int’l
L. 223–273 (2015); M. Tse, ‘One Giant Leap [Backwards] for Mankind’: Limited Liability in Private
Commercial Spaceflight, 79 Brook. L. Rev. 291–320 (2013).
79 Outer Space Act 1986 c. 38.
80 Section 38 of the Space Industry Act 2018 c. 5.
81 See s. 1 ibid.
82 Section 10 Outer Space Act.
83 Section 12 Deregulation Act 2015 c. 20.
84 G. Danby, Outer Space, Briefing Paper no. CBP 7464 of 10 Mar. 2017, House of Commons Library, at 4.
85 UKSA indicates that a ‘low-risk satellite’ would be at a ‘very low, sparsely-populated altitude, with an
orbital lifetime of less than a year and with few high-value assets nearby’. It would, ‘in most cases, carry
a negligible risk of third-party damage’ and, therefore, the UKSA may lower or waive the third-party
liability in such cases. See UKSA, Fact Sheet: The UK Space Agency’s New Requirements for In-orbit Third-
Party Liability Insurance, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/744408/TPL_Insurance_Fact_Sheetsw2.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
86 L. J. Smith & R. J. M. Leishman, Up, Up and Away: An Update on the UK’s Latest Plans for Space
Activities, 44 Air & Space L. 18 (2019).
87 See UKSA Guidance on Licence to operate a space object, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/apply-for-
a-license-under-the-outer-space-act-1986#space-liability-and-insurance-requirements (accessed 4
Feb. 2020). See also House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Satellites and Space,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS 257
the satellites to be covered under a single EUR 60,000,000 per-occurrence insurance
policy. If a certain number of satellites have been launched by that operator, the
UKSA may ask to add an aggregate (a limit) to the insurance policy, that is the
maximum that an insurer will pay out in total within the policy period.88 For example,
an operator of a satellite constellation may have an insurance policy of EUR
60,000,000 per-occurrence with EUR 200,000,000 in the aggregate, where the latter
is the total amount that the insurance company will pay for the policy period.89 This
approach seems to recognize the changes in the space sector and to address industry’s
concerns, in particular the possibility of launching large constellations of satellites. This
can also have a great effect with regard to investment and development of the UK
space sector.
4.4 SPACE DEBRIS
Space debris have not been defined in the Space Treaties created under the
auspices of the United Nations. The term was defined by ESA as ‘non-functional,
human-made objects, including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or
re-entering into Earth’s atmosphere’.90 One of the most important institutions
coordinating activities related to space debris is the Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordination Committee (IADC). It is an international forum of governmental
bodies which in 2020 associated thirteen space agencies.91 IADC created a similar
definition of space debris, as follows: ‘Space debris are all man made objects includ-
ing fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere,
that are non functional’.92 Space debris can be created as a result of a satellite
explosions, military tests, collisions with other objects in space, and other events.
According to ESA, in 2019 there were over 34,000 objects greater than 10 cm, and
Third Report of Session 2016–17, 25–26, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmse
lect/cmsctech/160/160.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
88 See the UKSA New Requirements for In-orbit Third-Party Liability Insurance, https://assets.publish
ing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/744408/TPL_
Insurance_Fact_Sheetsw2.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
89 Ibid.
90 Definition provided by the European Space Agency, https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_
Safety/Space_Debris/FAQ_Frequently_asked_questions (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
91 American NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), British UKSA (UK Space
Agency), Canadian CSA (Canadian Space Agency), Chinese CNSA (China National Space
Administration), European Space Agency, French CNES (Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales),
German DLR (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt), Indian ISRO (Indian Space
Research Organisation), Italian ASI (Agenzia Spaziale Italiana), Japanese JAXA (Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency), Russian ROSCOSMOS (Russian Federal Space Agency), South Korean
KARI (Korea Aerospace Research Institute) and Ukrainian NSAU (National Space Agency of
Ukraine).
92 IADC, supra n. 1, para. 3.1.
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millions smaller than 10 cm, classified as space debris and circling planet Earth.93 In
the future, satellite constellations may significantly increase the number of objects
classified as space debris which can affect the sustainability of space activities. The
historical example of the above mentioned94 collision of deactivated Russian
satellite Kosmos 2251 and operating American satellite Iridium shows that the
danger is real. Moreover, in this example, both satellites belonged to constellations.
At present, the mitigation of space debris is a matter for voluntary compliance
by states with non-legally binding space debris mitigation guidelines.95 The Space
Debris Mitigation Guidelines were adopted by the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) in 2007.96 They were also endorsed by the UN General Assembly
in its resolution 62/217 of 22 December 2007.97 In 2008 ESA developed its own
Requirements on Space Debris Mitigation for Agency Projects. They have since
been superseded by the standards developed by the International Organization for
Standarization (ISO), specifically the ISO24113 standard on debris mitigation
requirements.98 However, these Guidelines do not explicitly mention the issue
of large satellite constellations. In order to fill in the gap, in June 2019 the UN
COPUOS adopted ‘Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space
Activities’.99 The term long-term sustainability in the context of space activities is
defined as:
the ability to maintain the conduct of space activities indefinitely into the future in a
manner that realizes the objectives of equitable access to the benefits of the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes, in order to meet the needs of the present
generations while preserving the outer space environment for future generations.100
93 European Space Agency, Space Debris by the Numbers, ESA Safety & Security (Jan. 2019), https://
www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
See also ESA’s Annual Space Environment Report issued on 17 July 2019, https://www.sdo.esoc.
esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
94 See supra 4.1.
95 Anél Ferreira-Snyman, Environmental Responsibility for Space Debris, in Outer Space Law: Legal Policy and
Practice 264 (Yanal Abul Failat & Anél Ferreira-Snyman eds, Globe Law and Business 2017).
96 UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (UN, Vienna 2002), https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf
(accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
97 Resolution 62/217 of the UNGA: International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, adopted
during 62nd Session of the UNGA (22 Dec. 2007), A/RES/62/217.
98 The standards are available on the official ISO website: https://www.iso.org/standard/72383.html
(accessed 4 Feb. 2020). See also ESA Safety & Security, Mitigating Space Debris Generation, https://
www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Mitigating_space_debris_generation (accessed 4 Feb.
2020).
99 UN COPUOS, Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, Annex II of the
COPUOS Report of the 62nd Session (12–21 June 2019), https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/
data/documents/2019/a/a7420_0_html/V1906077.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
100 Section 5 ibid.
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The Guidelines specify that the emergence of large constellations may, among
other things, affect the long-term sustainability of space activities.101 They are
grouped into four categories: (1) policy and regulatory framework for space
activities; (2) safety of space operations; (3) international cooperation, capacity-
building, and awareness; (4) scientific and technical research and development. The
Guidelines are not legally binding and they provide a recommendation for states
and international intergovernmental organizations to take measures voluntarily,
through their own national, or other applicable, mechanisms, ‘to ensure that the
guidelines are implemented to the greatest extent feasible and practicable’.102
In 2007 IADC also published a set of Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines but
without addressing the issue of large satellite constellations, as this was not yet
relevant at the time.103 In September 2017, the IADC issued an official statement
concerning large satellite constellations in Low-Earth Orbit.104 The Committee
drew attention to a number of issues that should be taken into account by both
satellite manufacturers and satellite operators. Firstly, in order to minimize the
potential risk of collision, the Committee recommends considering an appropriate
distance between the various satellites of the same constellation, as well as between
different constellations. Additionally, their design should take into account the
possibility of manoeuvring.105 The Committee only mentioned the need of
‘sufficient altitude separation’ without specifying any buffer zone. Presumably,
imposition of a zone would require a technical justification and other considera-
tions. Therefore, these concerns could perhaps be addressed through inter-operator
coordination, or through inter-agency cooperation of the states concerned.
Secondly, the Committee recommends that the period of use for each satellite
should not exceed twenty-five years, after which they should be removed from the
orbit around the Earth.106 Moreover, satellites should be designed in such a way as
to increase the probability of their removal from the orbit in case of a failure or
termination of the mission.107 Third, satellites should be designed in such a way as
101 Section 1 ibid.
102 Section 16 ibid.
103 IADC, supra n. 1.
104 IADC Statement on Large Constellations of Satellites in Low Earth Orbit, ADC-15-03 (Sept. 2017),
https://www.iadc-online.org/Documents/IADC%20Statement%20on%20Large%20Constellations%
20rev%203.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
105 Section 4.2.1 ibid.
106 Section 4.4.3 ibid. It is worth noting that the UN COPUOS submitted an annual report during 55th
Session in which it is stated that this recommendation has not been followed at a satisfactory level and
that there is no visible tendency for its implementation. See IADC, An Overview of IADC’s Annual
Activities, 55th Session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN COPUOS, 13 (29
Jan.–9 Feb. 2018), https://www.iadc-online.org/Documents/IADC-18-02%20IADC%
20Presentation%20to%20the%2055th%20UN%20COPUOS%20STSC%20(2018).pdf (accessed 4
Feb. 2020).
107 Sections 4.2.2, 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 ibid.
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to minimize the likelihood of an explosion.108 According to ESA, break-ups,
accidental explosions, and other anomalous events are responsible for a significant
number of debris in Low-Earth Orbit.109 In particular, the IADC recommends
sound implementation of passivation measures,110 that is the elimination of all
stored energy on a spacecraft or orbital stages to reduce the chance of break-up.111
Fourth, the Committee recommends increasing the capacity to track and monitor
objects in space. Finally, operators should also make any information about
trajectory changes publicly available.112 These are the most important issues that
should help avoiding creation of space debris, but the list is not exhaustive.113
Several states have created internal regulations on space debris, based on the IADC
and the UN COPUOS Guidelines.114
It is worth noting that new space entrepreneurs seem to take into account
space sustainability. For example, OneWeb which was planning to launch a
constellation of over 800 satellites, prepared an official statement in which it
addressed the issues raised by IADC and pledged to work towards sustainable
space exploitation.115 OneWeb agreed on a number of points raised by the
Committee. In particular, it agreed that: large constellations should not overlap
in altitude; operators should be able to control the flight paths of their assets; and
spacecraft should be disposed of promptly and reliably at the end of their
missions.116 Moreover, OneWeb advocated for implementation of new systems
for the sustainability of industry-wide space activities. In particular, the company
supported initiatives such as (1) commercial tracking available to all operators; (2)
sharing information about owner/operator, satellite status, its manoeuvrability,
capability etc.; (3) development and incorporation of anomaly resolution aides;
and (4) active debris removal.117
108 Sections 4.3.2, 4.3.4 and 4.4.2 ibid.
109 As of Jan. 2019, ESA estimated over 500 of such events; see ESA Safety & Security, Space Debris by the
Numbers, https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers
(accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
110 Section 4.3.4 ibid.
111 Typical passivation measures include venting or burning excess propellant, discharging batteries and
relieving pressure vessels. See more: s. 3.4.1. of the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines.
112 Section 4.3.5 ibid.
113 Ibid., at 5.
114 F. Tronchetti, Fundamentals of Space Law and Policy 81–82 (Springer 2013).
115 See OneWeb, Thought Leadership in Space Sustainability, https://www.oneweb.world/assets/news/
media/OneWeb_Sustainable_Space.pdf (accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
116 Ibid., at 2.
117 Ibid.
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5 CONCLUSIONS
The great advantage of using large satellite constellations is their ability to provide
services, such as voice communication, data transmission, satellite television and
many others, to a great number of potential users. This is especially important in
remote or difficult to reach areas. Moreover, such constellations bring other
benefits to different actors, including financial benefits manifested in the form of
fees and taxes to government agencies and economic development to communities
that are able to access the internet and other services.
When considering registration of satellite constellations in a particular state,
licensees take into account a number of different factors, including the ease and
speed of obtaining permits, the relevant laws and procedures, fees, and location.
One of the largest costs that has to be considered is the required insurance cover.
In case of large constellations, insurance requirements may fluctuate around an
amount that is unprofitable. The UK seems to recognize this problem by introdu-
cing per-occurrence insurance with the option to add an aggregate to the third-
party liability insurance policy. The UK Government enables and encourages
commercial spaceflight activities within a comprehensive, yet flexible, regulatory
framework. Such flexibility in the imposition of insurance conditions is to be
welcomed for the UK space sector to thrive and expand.
It is worth noting that not all states register their space objects. Some states
that actively participate in space exploitation are not parties to the Registration
Convention. Moreover, there are many states that do not maintain their own
national register.118 In cases when two or more states are involved in a given
mission, they do not always agree on which one should register the object.119
Registration is of great importance in case of large constellations. Some even
suggest that satellites that are launched together and have the same technical
characteristics and owner, should be registered together, in one application, in
the same administrative process, and not separately.120 A similar solution could be
taken into account in the administrative process related to the issuance of radio
frequencies and orbital slots. The processes and regulations shall keep pace with
innovations in the space sector.
At present, there are no legally binding provisions that would adequately
regulate the matter of space debris. There is no obligation to remove an object
from Earth orbit and, therefore, space objects often remain in orbit for many years
118 According to UN OOSA, in 2019 there were only forty states and organizations maintaining their
own register. See http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/national-registries/index.html
(accessed 4 Feb. 2020).
119 Lyall & Larsen, supra n. 6, at 79.
120 Ibid., at 242.
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after they stopped being operations. An implementation of a legally binding
provision on international level may turn out to be very difficult, as it requires a
compromise and political will of states. Several states have created internal regula-
tions on space debris, based on the IADC and the UN COPUOS Guidelines.121
Currently, such implementation seems to be the most achievable solution.
However, states could perhaps go a step further by requiring, from the applicants
during the licensing process, to provide relevant procedures and technical measures
preventing harmful interference and congestion in space. This could be one of the
necessary conditions to obtain a licence, just like with the current UK requirement
for space insurance. Any mandatory measures to mitigate space debris are likely to
lead to an increase in the cost of space activities, especially in the context of large
constellations. However, the problem of space debris is closely linked to the issue
of liability and responsibility and, therefore, an adequate legal protection is in
states’ direct interest.
121 Tronchetti, supra n. 113, at 81–82.
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